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DIVORCE—PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION OF 
PROPERTY: THE EFFECT OF THE DEATH OF A PARTY 
DURING A DIVORCE PROCEEDING ON THE INCIDENTAL 
ISSUES TO THE DIVORCE 
Albrecht v. Albrecht, 2014 ND 221, 856 N.W.2d 755 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Albrecht v. Albrecht, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a 
judgment in a divorce action is not final and appealable when it dissolves 
the parties’ marital status but saves division of the incidences of marriage 
for further proceedings.  The court reviewed the district court decision to 
allow the deceased party’s estate to act as a substitute for the deceased 
party, Sharleen Albrecht, for purposes of distributing the parties’ marital 
property.  The court concluded that Sharleen Albrecht’s death before the 
entry of a final judgment abated the divorce action.  The court reached this 
conclusion despite the district court having entered a “judgment” for 
divorce prior to Sharleen’s Albrecht’s death.  Albrecht illustrates the 
necessity to explicitly certify the severance of a judgment of divorce from 
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I. FACTS 
In February 2010, after a marriage of nearly fifty years, Glenvin 
Albrecht sued Sharleen Albrecht for a divorce in the District Court of 
Stutsman County, Southeast Judicial District, North Dakota.1  Trial for the 
divorce took place on October 1, 2012, and an “order for judgment on the 
divorce expressly directing entry of judgment” was entered October 18, 
2012. 2   On October 19, 2012, a judgment was entered “order[ing], 
adjudg[ing] and decree[ing] that each party was entitled to a divorce from 
the other.”3  This judgment reserved “disposition of all property issues for 
further proceedings.”4   
 
1. Albrecht v. Albrecht, 2014 ND 221, ¶ 2, 856 N.W.2d 755, 756. 
2. Id. ¶ 23, 856 N.W.2d at 762. 
3. Id. ¶ 2, 856 N.W.2d at 756. 
4. Id. 
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The district court held a trial on the reserved property issues on March 
5, 2013.5  The district court then issued a memorandum opinion on August 
2, 2013, which stated Sharleen Albrecht had died following the March 5, 
2013 trial and distributed the martial property equally.6  The August 2, 
2013, memorandum opinion ordered that Glenvin Albrecht pay Sharleen 
Albrecht “$815,479 to equalize the property distribution.”7  The district 
“court [then] issued a subsequent order substituting Sharleen Albrecht’s 
estate as a party in the divorce action.”8  Glenvin Albrecht appealed from a 
September 27, 2013, judgment allocating the parties’ marital property to the 
North Dakota Supreme Court.9 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has had opportunities in the past to 
analyze divorce cases where one party to the action has died during 
proceedings.10  In most civil actions for damages, the death of a party to the 
action does not abate the other party’s ability to recover from the deceased 
party’s estate.11   Divorce actions are unique, however, in that they are 
entirely personal to the two parties to the marriage.12 
A.  DIVORCE ACTION ABATES UPON DEATH OF A PARTY TO IT  
The North Dakota Supreme Court held in Thorson v. Thorson13 that a 
divorce action abates upon the death of a party to it.14  In Thorson, decided 
in 1996, one of the parties, Doris Thorson, died during the course of the 
divorce action.15  Her estate attempted to substitute her daughter as the 
plaintiff to the divorce action to seek equitable distribution of the marital 
property. 16   The court stated that “in North Dakota, marriage is a 
relationship personal to the parties of the marriage.”17  The court also stated 
that under North Dakota statutory law, the marriage was dissolved by the 
 
5. Id. ¶ 23, 856 N.W.2d at 762. 




10. Jochim v. Jochim, 2006 ND 186, ¶1, 721 N.W.2d 25, 25; Thorson v. Thorson, 541 
N.W.2d 692, 693 (N.D. 1996). 
11. Jochim, ¶ 8, 721 N.W.2d at 27. 
12. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01 (2015) (“Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a 
civil contract between one man and one woman to which the consent of the parties is essential.”). 
13. 541 N.W.2d 692 (N.D. 1996). 
14. Id. at 693.  
15. Id. at 694. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 696. 
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death of one of the parties to it.18  As such, the court in Thorson reasoned 
that the death of Doris Thorson left no issue for the court to decide.19  
Despite arguably conflicting statutory North Dakota law regarding the 
circumstances under which death causes abatement of a civil action, the 
Thorson court looked to other states to find that a “greater weight of 
authority holds that a divorce action is abated upon the death of one of the 
parties.”20 
The Thorson court also specifically addressed the issue of division of 
marital property following the death of a party to the divorce during 
proceedings.21   The court reasoned that so long as no dispositive order 
dividing marital property had been made prior to the death of a party to the 
divorce, the marital property could not be divided at the request of the 
deceased party’s estate.22 
B. AN ORDER FOR JUDGMENT IS INSUFFICIENT TO NULLIFY 
ABATEMENT 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has previously held that an order 
for judgment is insufficient to nullify abatement of a divorce action if one 
of the parties to the divorce dies before final judgment is entered.23  In 
Jochim v. Jochim, decided in 2006, two parties to a divorce stipulated to all 
issues of the divorce “except the amount of child support to be awarded, 
whether spousal support should be awarded, and whether either party 
should be awarded attorney’s fees.”24  Following trial on the remaining 
issues, the court entered an order for judgment on October 24, 2005.25  
Then, on November 1, 2005, Greg Jochim, a party to the divorce, died in a 
car accident.26  A judgment and divorce decree was entered one week later 
on November 8, 2005. 27   The surviving party to the divorce then 
successfully moved to vacate the November 8 judgment.28 
 
18. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-01 (2015) (“Marriage is dissolved only: 1. By the death of 
one of the parties; or 2. By a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction decreeing a divorce of 
the parties.”). 
19. Thorson, 541 N.W.2d at 696. 
20. Id. at 695. 
21. Id. at 694. 
22. Id. 
23. Jochim v. Jochim, 2006 ND 186, ¶ 9, 721 N.W.2d 25, 27. 
24. Id.  ¶ 2, 721 N.W.2d at 26. 
25. Id.  
26. Id.  
27. Id.  
28. Id. ¶ 3. 
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Greg Jochim’s estate challenged the motion to vacate, arguing that the 
divorce had already been effectively granted at the time of death, since the 
parties stipulated to most of the issues and the district court issued an order 
for judgment of divorce.29  The North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned, 
however, that the order for judgment prior to Greg Jochim’s death was 
insufficient to make the divorce final.30  The court further reasoned that an 
order for judgment is not sufficient to conclude divorce proceedings and is 
not appealable absent an entry of judgment by the court.31  As such, the 
court held the divorce action was concluded by the death of Greg Jochim on 
November 1, 2005, and not by the October 24, 2005, order for judgment.32 
Although both Thorson and Jochim are relatively recent cases, they 
represent the best opportunities prior to Albrecht the North Dakota Supreme 
Court has had to review the effect of a party’s death during divorce 
proceedings.  In Thorson, despite conflicting statutory law, as discussed 
hereinafter, the court held that death abates a divorce action in the middle of 
proceedings. 33   However, there was never an order for judgment in 
Thorson, 34  and the circumstances were fairly straightforward when 
compared to Jochim.   
The abatement doctrine adopted in Thorson was further explained in 
Jochim in the face of an order for judgment of divorce entered prior to the 
death of a party, which was ultimately deemed inconsequential as judgment 
only occurred after the death of a party.35  The Jochim holding thus makes 
clear that even if the issues to the divorce proceeding have all been decided, 
the divorce is only truly final once judgment of divorce has been entered.36  
Although both Thorson and Jochim are factually similar to Albrecht, the 
new issue presented by Albrecht is the consequence of an order labeled 
“judgment,” though perhaps mistakenly so, entered prior to the death of a 
party to the divorce but saving issues to the divorce for later consideration. 
 
29. Id. ¶ 5. 
30. Id. ¶ 10, 721 N.W.2d at 26; see N.D.R. Civ. P. 58 (“On the filing of an order for 
judgment, the prevailing party must submit to the clerk an appropriate form of the judgment. The 
clerk must sign and file the judgment and enter it in the register of civil actions, at which time the 
judgment becomes effective.”). 
31. Jochim, ¶ 10, 721 N.W.2d at 26 
32. Id. ¶ 12, 721 N.W.2d at 28. 
33. Thorson v. Thorson, 541 N.W.2d 692, 696. 
34. See id.  
35. Jochim, ¶¶ 1-3, 721 N.W.2d at 26. 
36. Id. ¶ 10, 721 N.W.2d at 27. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
The North Dakota Supreme Court divided its analysis of Albrecht into 
two parts: the abatement doctrine and the divisible divorce doctrine.37 
A. THE COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF CONFLICTING LAWS 
REGARDING ABATEMENT OF A DIVORCE ACTION 
There are several conflicting statutory laws relevant to the abatement of 
a divorce action by death of a party to the action during proceedings in 
North Dakota.38  Under North Dakota statutory law, marriage can only be 
dissolved by the death of one of the parties to the action or a judgment of 
divorce by a court.39  However, the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure 
provide that death does not abate any action after an order for judgment is 
made in that action.40  Therefore, when a party to a divorce dies after an 
order for judgment has been made but prior to the entry of judgment, the 
laws conflict.41   
The North Dakota Supreme Court held in Thorson that the rules of civil 
procedure do not create an exception to the general rule that death of a party 
to a divorce action abates the action because there is no longer a marriage 
for the court to dissolve when a party to the divorce action has died.42  The 
Thorson court explained that the “greater weight of authority” holds that 
death abates a divorce action, with citations to other Midwest states, 
including South Dakota, Iowa and Nebraska, that have marriage statutes 
similar to North Dakota.43 
In Jochim, the North Dakota Supreme Court furthered its analysis of 
the finality of an order for judgment and reasoned that under the rules of 
civil procedure,44 although an order for judgment is required before a valid 
judgment can be entered, it alone is insufficient to make a divorce final.45  
 
37. See generally Albrecht v. Albrecht, 2014 ND 221, ¶¶ 8-15, 856 N.W.2d 755, 758-60. 
38. See generally id. ¶¶ 3-7, 856 N.W.2d at 756-58. 
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-01 (2015). 
40. N.D.R. CIV. P. 25(a)(3) (“If a party dies after a verdict is rendered or an order for 
judgment is made, the action does not abate, and substitution of parties must be allowed.”). See 
also N.D.R. CIV. P. 54(d) (“If a party dies after a verdict or decision on any issue of fact and 
before judgment, the court may still render judgment.”). 
41. See Albrecht, ¶3, 856 N.W.2d at 756. 
42. Thorson v. Thorson, 541 N.W.2d 692, 696. 
43. Id. at 695. 
44. N.D.R. Civ. P. 58. 
45. See Jochim v. Jochim, 2006 ND 186, ¶ 10, 721 N.W.2d 25, 27-28. 
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Under North Dakota law, a “judgment” includes any order from which an 
appeal lies,46 and an order for judgment is not appealable.47 
In light of the holdings in Thorson and Jochim, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court found in Albrecht that the October 19, 2012, “judgment” 
entered by the district court was not dispositive of all the issues of the 
divorce and therefore was not a true judgment effectuating a divorce.48  The 
court acknowledged that the district court “judgment” addressed the parties’ 
marital status but that it also, however, reserved the issue of division of 
property for a later evidentiary hearing. 49   Therefore, the district court 
“judgment” was not final and appealable and was not dispositive of the 
divorce action.50  In addition, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that 
Sharleen Albrecht did not request certification51 that the parties’ marital 
status was dissolved following the October 19, 2012, “judgment.”52  Such 
certification would have allowed the district court to direct final judgment 
as to the marital status of the parties but save the issue of property 
distribution for later proceedings.53 
B. THE COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE DIVISIBLE DIVORCE 
DOCTRINE 
The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized the divisible divorce 
doctrine, which allows the parties to a divorce action to sever judgment of 
the dissolution of marital status from the adjudication of the incidences of 
marriage.54  This doctrine allows the parties to a divorce to become single 
with the option to legally remarry, while partitioning the other issues to the 
divorce to a later date through a severed judgment of a court.  Under the 
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may only sever the claims 
 
46. N.D.R. Civ. P. 54(a) (“‘Judgment’ as used in these rules includes a decree and any order 
from which an appeal lies.”).  
47. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-27-02 (2015) (listing what orders are reviewable). 
48. Albrecht v. Albrecht, 2014 ND 221, ¶ 9, 856 N.W.2d 755, 758-59. 
49. Id. at 759. 
50. Id. 
51. See N.D.R. CIV. P 54(b) (“If an action presents more than one claim for relief, whether as 
a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, or if multiple parties are involved, the 
court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties 
only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.  Otherwise, any order 
or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and 
liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and 
may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the 
parties’ rights and liabilities.”).  
52. Albrecht, ¶ 10, 856 N.W.2d at 759. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Kelly v. Kelly, 2009 ND 20, ¶ 9, 759 N.W.2d 721, 723). 
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to an action if it “expressly determines that there is no just reason for 
delay.”55 
In Albrecht, the district court did not explicitly sever the dissolution of 
the parties’ marital status from the property distribution.56   The district 
court’s October 19, 2012, “judgment” both ordered “that each party was 
entitled to a divorce from the other” and that property issues were reserved 
for further proceedings.57  The district court did not expressly state there 
was any reason to sever the claims or that there was any just reason to avoid 
delaying the dissolution of the parties’ marital status.58  As such, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court did not find a severance had occured and reversed 
the district court decision, holding that “Sharleen Albrecht’s death before 
entry of a final judgment from which an appeal could be taken abated the 
divorce action.”59 
C. CONCURRENCE: IF THE DISTRICT COURT HAD EXPRESSLY 
ALLOWED THE PARTIES TO REMARRY, THE JUDGMENT WOULD 
HAVE BEEN FINAL 
Chief Justice VandeWalle provided a concurring opinion. 60   The 
concurrence agreed that the October 19, 2012, “judgment” was not a final 
and appealable judgment.61  Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote separately to 
note that if a Rule 54(b)62  order were part of the “judgment” or if the 
“judgment” contained a provision allowing either party to marry 
immediately, he would consider the “judgment” final and the marriage 
dissolved.63  The Chief Justice further noted that it is the duty of the court 
granting a divorce to specify in the order for judgment whether the parties 
are permitted to remarry.64 
 
55. N.D.R. CIV. P. 54(b) 
56. Albrecht, ¶ 14, 856 N.W.2d at 760. 
57. Id. ¶ 2, 856 N.W.2d at 756. 
58. See generally id. ¶¶ 2-6, 856 N.W.2d at 756-57. 
59. Id. ¶ 15, 856 N.W.2d at 760. 
60. Id. ¶18, 856 N.W.2d at 761 (VandeWalle, C. J., concurring). 
61. Id.  
62. N.D.R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
63. Albrecht, ¶ 18, 856 N.W.2d at 761. 
64. Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-02 (2015) (“It is the duty of the court granting a 
divorce to specify in the order for judgment whether either or both of the parties shall be permitted 
to marry, and if so, when. The court shall have jurisdiction to modify the decree of divorce at any 
time so as to permit one or both of the parties to marry, if the court deems it right.”). 
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D. DISSENT: THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SEVERED THE DIVORCE 
ACTION FOR THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION PROCEEDING 
Justice Crothers, joined by Justice Kapsner, provided the court’s 
dissenting opinion.65  The dissent disagreed that the divorce action abated 
and argued that the district court properly severed the divorce action from 
the property distribution proceeding.66   Justice Crothers argued that the 
majority “overlooks the reality that a divorce action and the marital 
property division cannot always occur simultaneously.”67   As such, the 
dissent interpreted the October 19, 2012, “judgment” as a severance of 
marital status and property distribution.68  Justice Crothers also noted that 
permitting severance of divorce from adjudication is a narrow holding, 
which “should not be read as granting license for piecemeal adjudication of 
cases in other areas of civil law.”69 
IV. IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA PRACTITIONERS 
As acknowledged by the dissent, the holding in Albrecht is a narrow 
one.  The 3-2 split of the North Dakota Supreme Court highlights how 
difficult it is to predict whether what purports to be a “judgment” is in fact 
so. It also highlights the importance of certifying issues of severance in a 
divorce action on a case-by-case basis. 
Albrecht illustrates the importance for the North Dakota lawyer 
representing a party to a divorce to request express severance of the marital 
status from the remaining issues to the divorce action if the client so wishes. 
In other words, if a party to a divorce wishes to quickly remarry or if there 
may be a significant delay in the division of property that party’s lawyer 
should request the court to explicitly and unmistakably sever the marital 
status portion of the action and enter judgment thereon immediately.  The 
lawyer should present evidence that there is no just reason to delay final 
judgment of the divorce.  The desired outcome is that the client may 
continue her life without having to question whether she is still married in 
the eyes of the law months and potentially years after what she believed 
was a valid judgment dissolving her marriage.  In addition, in divorce 
actions for elderly or sick parties, certification of severance of marital status 
is particularly important for estate planning purposes. 
 
65. Albrecht, ¶ 19, 856 N.W.2d at 761 (Crothers, J., joined by Kapsner, J., dissenting). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at ¶ 20. 
68. Id. at ¶ 23, 856 N.W.2d at 762. 
69. Id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Albrecht’s holding that a judgment in a divorce action is not final and 
appealable when it dissolves the parties’ marital status but saves division of 
the incidences of marriage for further proceedings expands upon the 
principles set out in Thorson and Jochim.  It highlights the importance for 
both lawyers and judges to follow the statutory and common law 
requirements in certifying the severance of issues to a divorce or writing a 
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